He himself has also said:

“To their assertion, ‘Affirming the attributes entails multiplicity in the divine reality, making that reality contingent,’ we reply: If you mean that this reality would need an external cause, that does not follow, since those attributes may depend upon the essence that necessarily exists in and of itself. If you mean that those particular attributes depend for their existence upon that particular essence, we accept this. Where, then, is the impossibility?”

He says:

“Moreover, in your view, relations are attributes that exist outside the mind, so the objection you raise against us applies equally to you. The same objection also applies to you regarding the form of intelligible objects imprinted in His essence.”

We have already explained that these things are not other than Him according to this usage, so it is not correct to say that He depends upon something other than Himself. If, however, by ‘two things that are other than one another’ he means two things of which one may be known without the other, we say that the existence of these meanings with respect to Allah Most High is agreed upon among