the contrary to be true. It knows that a spatially situated thing does not depend on any space or direction beyond the spatial occupancy inhering in it. It thus becomes clear that his claim that reason knows a spatially situated thing to depend on a space separate from it contradicts what is known by reason. Rather, it depends on a space constituted by its own enclosing boundary. He has therefore reversed the proposition, making the separate space associated with direction independent of the spatially situated thing, while making it rationally impossible for that thing to exist without this space. The invalidity of these two premises thus establishes the invalidity of the argument’s first premise, namely: “If it were confined to space and direction, it would depend on something other than itself.” We now turn to the second premise.

The fifteenth point: Your statement, “If it were confined to space and direction, it would depend on something other than itself,” is ambiguous. Similar wording has already been discussed on more than one occasion. For many, or most, of those who affirm the divine attributes—including your own associates—the term “other” denotes one of two things that can be separate from each other in time, place, or existence, or one of which can exist without the other. For many among both those who deny the attributes and those who affirm them, it means anything such that one may know