different from one another, they would be positive realities. They would either be capable of being pointed to or not. The first possibility divides into two cases: either they inhere in bodies—in which case it would be impossible for a body to occupy them, since that would entail circularity—or they do not inhere in bodies, despite being capable of being pointed to. But that is what it means to be spatially located. Thus, a spatial locus would itself be spatially located. Everything spatially located has a spatial locus, which would in turn have another spatial locus, entailing an infinite regress. If, on the other hand, a spatial locus could not be pointed to, it would be impossible for a body that can be pointed to to occupy it.” He said: “It is thus established that a spatial locus is pure negation and, being so, cannot differ from another spatial locus.”

He also stated in his Nihāya, in the second argument for the world’s having a beginning, that it is contingent and that everything contingent has a beginning. He established its contingency in several ways, including the discussion we quoted from him earlier in establishing that