or magnitude, then this response of yours would not be valid: “Describing Him as contemptible would follow only if He had a spatial location and magnitude, such that He could be said to be smaller than something else.” Rather, the answer should have been: “He need not be more contemptible than an indivisible atom, whether or not He is said to have a spatial location and magnitude.” But had he said this, the falsity of his statement would have become apparent. For it is known through sensory perception and necessity that anything having a spatial location and magnitude, yet described as imperceptible to the senses and incapable of being pointed to, is smaller than an indivisible atom.

What further clarifies this is that the question he attributed to his opponent constitutes a counterargument. When he presented his argument that He is not in any direction, on the grounds that this would entail composition and contemptibility, his opponent replied: “Your assertion that He cannot be perceived by the senses or pointed to entails that He is nonexistent, which is more contemptible than being an indivisible atom.” Thus, he told him: “Your position entails greater contemptibility than that which you charged the proponents of affirmation with.”

He answered this counterargument by denying its conclusion and maintaining that its validity was inseparable from the validity of his opponent’s position. This is among the most unsound answers, for the opponent says: “On the contrary, in my view He does have a spatial location and magnitude. Why, then, do you say that He does not? Is this not precisely the point at issue?”

As for your statement, “If He has no spatial location or magnitude, then describing Him as contemptible does not follow,” you may be asked: “Who has conceded that to you? Is this not precisely the point at issue? And the argument you have presented was advanced only