more than one,” or it is said, “If He could be pointed to as an object of sense perception, He would be either divisible or indivisible,” or, “If He were above the Throne, He would be either such-and-such or such-and-such, and He would be a body,” or something similar, then all such arguments necessarily require a universal proposition: that everything that is one is of this nature; that everything to which one can point as an object of sense perception falls into one of the two categories; and that everything above something else must fall under such-and-such alternatives.

They must include Allah Most High within these general, universal propositions. They then pass the same judgment upon Him as upon all the other particulars falling under the proposition, placing Him and them on an equal footing in this respect. His sharing with those particulars in that judgment—whether unconditional or conditional—and His resemblance to them in this respect are precisely what constitutes inferential reasoning.