themselves one, without multiplicity, plurality, or composition. It is the mind that takes a single thing, divides it, and then recomposes it after dividing it, just as it takes two things, likens one to the other, and then treats them as one on the basis of that likeness.

What is said of likening and comparison—which comes down to a general, universal meaning shared by both things—and what is said of parts and attributes—which comes down to meanings distinguished in the mind and then combined and composed by it—form the basis of discussions of likening and comparison, and of ascribing corporeality, that is, composition. In the former, the mind makes the many one; in the latter, it makes the one many. Yet these are two valid ways of considering things, without contradicting the actual reality in the other case.

For this reason, minds frequently err here: there is a correspondence and conformity between what exists in the mind and what exists in concrete reality. In one respect, this is the conformity of knowledge to its object; in another respect, there is a difference, since the knowledge within the soul is not identical to the external reality. Thus, because of what exists between the two