and mental multiplicity do not entail that the same holds in external reality, and they liken this to the unity found in universal concepts. The mind apprehends a single human nature and a single body, conceived as universal and general, or unrestricted, corresponding to the individuals existing in external reality. Yet nothing exists externally except as a particular existent; no universal or general thing exists there. Rather, because realities resemble one another, what exists in one has its counterpart in another. Thus, they are the same in kind, not in individual identity; considered individually, one is instead the counterpart of the other.

If this resemblance and likeness existing externally cause the mind to apprehend a general, universal meaning encompassing both things, even though no general universal exists externally, then the same may be said of what is found within a single concrete entity and is thought to constitute quantitative and qualitative parts: it is the mind that separates these and distinguishes them from one another; otherwise, they are in