Likewise, given that a servant possesses a measure of oneness and of the quality denoted by samad, despite being a body among other bodies, it is clear that an existent’s being a body does not prevent it from being one, from being one of those bodies, or from being samad. Nor does its being a body prevent it from being living, knowing and powerful. Yet in none of his attributes does a servant possess the perfection that belongs to Allah, nor anything approaching it.

Thus, when Allah Most High is described as One, Samad, All-Knowing and All-Powerful, He possesses these attributes in the utmost perfection, in which nothing whatsoever resembles Him in any respect. But if the meanings they mention—which they regard as multiplicity, plurality and composition—are established for every existent, without preventing a created being from being one, how could this prevent the God whom nothing resembles from being One?

This is made clear by the ninth argument: namely, that these meanings, concerning which it is known