the other. Thus, existence may obtain without necessity, or without agency, or without knowledge and providence, or without the existent being living, knowing, powerful, and so forth.

If, however, by “two distinct things” is meant two things, one of which can be known without the other—for example, by perceiving one without the other, as mentioned by those who allow a point to be indicated without indicating what is above it—then the response is this: There is no doubt that some meanings established for Allah can be known without others. One may know that He exists without knowing that He necessarily exists, and know that He necessarily exists without knowing that He is an agent. One may know this without knowing that He is living, knowing, powerful, or otherwise.

Since distinction in this sense is established on every account and acknowledged by everyone, and no existent can exist without it, even if it is absolutely one, then whether this is called compounding or composition, or neither, is merely a verbal dispute that does not undermine the point at issue.

The eighth response is to say: These people’s terminology is better. For once it is established that existing things are divided into single and composite things, simple and compound things, or one and many, it is known that among existing things there are those that are neither compound nor composite nor multiple. Yet nothing that exists is devoid of these meanings. It is therefore known that these meanings are not incompatible with a created thing being one and single. How, then, could they be incompatible with the Creator being one