a composite, divisible body, it need not follow that He is a composite, divisible body—unless every living, knowing, powerful being must be a composite, divisible body. They make the same reply to anyone who says that His life, knowledge, and power are accidents.

These people likewise address anyone who concedes the affirmation of the attributes, saying: If that which subsists in another—such as life, knowledge, and power—is not, in your view, an accident, even though it shares these characteristics with all other attributes, then likewise that which subsists in itself need not be a composite, divisible body, even though it shares with other self-subsisting beings the characteristics you have mentioned.

There is no difference whatsoever between the two cases. For what is known of that which subsists in itself is that it is a body, and of that which subsists in another, that it is an accident. Moreover, that which subsists in itself must have one part distinguishable from another, while that which subsists in another must depend upon the subject in which it inheres. Thus, if you affirm something subsisting in another that differs in this respect from what is known of the condition of that which subsists in itself, you are likewise obliged to affirm something subsisting in itself that differs from what is known of the condition of self-subsisting beings.

In sum, He, glorified is He, subsists in Himself, is distinct from all else, has names, and is described by attributes. If His being immense and great entails His being like other immense and great beings in necessarily admitting division