It may be said to him: These people may say, “It is neither identical with it nor other than it.” For it is well known among their principles that something is “other than” a thing if it can be separated from it, and that an attribute of a thing, or a part of a whole, is neither identical with it nor other than it. This founder’s school is among those who hold this view. Accordingly, something’s not being identical with another does not necessarily mean that it is other than it. Thus, this does not lead to allowing that a mountain is one single thing.

If they may say that something possessing multiple attributes is one, without multiplicity or composition, and is indivisible, then it may likewise be said that something possessing magnitude is one, without multiplicity or composition, and is indivisible—even though, in both cases, one can point to something within it that is not identical with another part.

If it is said: This entails that every body is neither composite nor divisible. The point at issue concerns this objection and its contrary, for this objection distinguishes between something of great magnitude in the observable realm and something of great magnitude in the unobservable realm, holding that the observable is divisible, unlike the unobservable.