it contains actually existing parts. Thus, being something that can be pointed to through sensory perception does not entail both consequences. Rather, if it is divisible as he described, this does not entail two things; at most, it entails the composition he mentioned, which has already been discussed. If it is not divisible—which, in his view, is possible only according to those who affirm atoms—this entails that it is exceedingly small. Yet either atoms do not exist in reality, or they do exist; and no rational person would say that the Lord of the worlds is the size of an atom. Thus, nothing remains to be considered except the divisibility and composition he mentioned, which have already been discussed.

It has therefore been established that this does not entail both consequences together. Rather, if it entails anything, it entails only one of them: one on one assumption, and the other on another assumption. It is thus clear that being something that can be pointed to through sensory perception does not entail both consequences he mentioned; if it entails anything, it entails only one of them.

The third point concerns the question he raised: why could it not