their meaning, while refusing to state or express it”—there is evidence that he rejected the statement that Allah has no limit, and that, contrary to Ibn Fūrak’s claim, he does not deny a limit or boundary. He himself explained what he meant by the boundary he denied, for he counted this among the objectionable assertions of the Jahmiyya. Undoubtedly, what he affirmed—that He is one, distinct in Himself, separate from His creatures, above the world—contradicts the claim that He has no limit.

Ibn Fūrak then said:

“Another section. He then mentioned a statement pointing to” his fundamental principle—which is correct—that two things’ sharing an affirmative description does not necessarily entail likeness, just as their sharing a negative description does not. This is his argument against the Mu‘tazila when they told him that he had necessarily asserted likeness by saying that Allah Most High is separate and distinct from His creation: if He and created beings are described in this way, sharing this description makes them alike.

He replied:

“If, as you claim, our saying, ‘Allah Most High is one, distinct,’ necessarily entails likeness, then so too does your saying, ‘He is one, not distinct, and one, not distinct.’ For both descriptions occur among created beings: distinct and distinct, and not distinct and [not] distinct. Why, then, should it not be, if the judgment concerning