do not say this. For they regard each of the hypostases as a god who is invoked and worshipped, while maintaining that the three are one God. Yet part of a god is not itself a god. Rather, they hold that the essence, characterized by these three attributes, constitutes a hypostasis together with each attribute.

They then say that one of these is united with Christ. If the union is with an attribute, an attribute is not a god who creates and provides sustenance, whereas they regard Christ as a god. If, however, the essence is what is united with him, then Christ would be the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit—God. Yet they do not say this. They say only that what is united with him is the Word, which is the Son, and for this reason they call him the Son of God. They also say that he is God, because what is united with him is the essence, which is God. Thus, they make what is united with him the essence together with one attribute, rather than the essence together with the other two attributes. But it is well known that the attributes do not separate from the essence. They may also say, as this author has reported, that the hypostases are parts and components, each of which is also a god.

And once it is understood that, by denying divisibility and partition, the leading proponents of this view do not mean either actual division through one part separating from another or the possibility of such division—even though the wording conveys this meaning more plainly than any other—for by most of their technical expressions they do not intend the meanings ordinarily understood in the language, but rather meanings peculiar to their own discussions of affirmation and negation; hence Imam Ahmad said of them, “They speak in ambiguous terms