neither precludes the necessity of that which entails it nor necessitates its existence.

The second point: The fact that a thing’s individuation cannot occur in anything else does not entail the absence of a counterpart to that individuation in the second thing. It entails only that the very same individuation does not occur in the second thing. The opponent affirms only a counterpart to that individuation in the second thing, not the very same individuation. Why, then, do you say that a counterpart to that individuation is not necessary? If you say, “It follows that every individuation must have a counterpart,” the reply is: “Each of the two individuations is the counterpart of the other.”

The third point: A thing’s individuation has the same implications for denying the necessity of a likeness as it does for denying the existence of a likeness. Now, it is evident that if the impossibility of an individuation occurring in something else entailed the absence of a likeness, it would follow that nothing could have a counterpart or anything similar or like it. For everything has a particular individual identity that cannot occur in anything else. If the fact that a thing’s individual identity does not occur in anything else entailed the absence of its likeness and counterpart, then nothing in existence would have a counterpart or anything similar to it. This is utterly false. If, therefore, a thing’s individuation does not preclude the existence of a counterpart, neither does it preclude the necessity of a counterpart, for it establishes neither conclusion.