involving conditions. Thus, the existence of each of the two things may be a condition for the existence of the other, such that neither exists without the other. This is possible, not impossible.

As for his statement, “The existence of a thing either depends on the existence of something resembling it,” if by dependence he means dependence in the sense of necessary coexistence, whereby each exists alongside the other, why does he say that this is impossible?

As for his statement, “Resemblance entails equivalence in necessary implications; hence, if the existence of the first depends on the existence of the second, the existence of the second must depend on the existence of the first,” the reply is: at most, this establishes that each depends on the existence of the other. Yet this is precisely the initial proposition at issue: a thing’s dependence on the existence of something resembling it. Why, then, do you say that this is impossible, if dependence means that it must exist with the other, not that it must exist through the other?

Clearly, this does not entail a thing’s dependence on itself, nor is it impossible according to the self-evident principles of reason. Rather, what is impossible is for each to owe its existence to the other. There is a difference between its existing with the other