particular respect. This establishes difference in that particular respect, even if similarity holds in other respects, so that the two have both something in common and something that distinguishes them. His opponent has not denied the existence of such a being. Indeed, he has reported a consensus that no rational person has affirmed similarity in every respect. Thus, this argument does not help him.

Third: The opponent whom he mentions in this premise demanded proof of something that is neither within the world nor outside it, and stated that he would acknowledge this only if similarity in this respect were known to him. Unless, therefore, he provides proof that the existence of a being does not entail the existence of something similar to it in this respect—whether a proof specific to this respect or one encompassing this and other respects—he has not established his argument. This proof establishes only the possibility of difference in that particular respect. The possibility of difference in that particular respect does not entail the possibility of difference with regard to being neither within the world nor outside it.

He then said: “The second argument is that the existence of a thing either depends on the existence of something similar to it or does not. The former is false, because if the two were similar, they would necessarily be alike in all their necessary concomitants