rejected by the intuitive judgments of reason, then we know that the absence of a counterpart to a thing does not entail the absence of that thing.”

There are several points to make here. First: The fact that intuition does not regard something as implausible does not mean that reasoned inquiry will not regard it as implausible. Likewise, its not being rejected by rational intuition does not mean that it will not be rejected upon rational reflection. This amounts only to saying that its impossibility is not known intuitively. Yet there is a difference between not knowing intuitively that something is impossible and knowing intuitively that it is possible. If its impossibility is not known intuitively, one cannot therefore say, “Thus we know that the absence of a counterpart to a thing does not entail the absence of that thing.” This is not established by what he has said. What he has said establishes only the absence of intuitive knowledge of the existence of a being without a counterpart; it does not exclude the existence of knowledge of its possibility.

Had he said, “We know intuitively that a thing may exist without having a counterpart, and we know intuitively that the existence of something without a counterpart is possible,” the proof would have been complete. But he has mentioned only mental possibility, not external possibility. Mental possibility involves knowledge of neither impossibility nor possibility, whereas knowledge of external possibility does involve knowledge of possibility.

Second: What he claimed was that the existence of a being endowed with particular attributes is not regarded as implausible, such that everything else differs from it in that