a true statement accepted by consensus. On either supposition, there is no sound basis for disputing with its proponent.

If it is said, “This disputant sought a counterpart precisely in the matter under dispute, saying: ‘I will not affirm a being that is neither inside nor outside the world unless it has something resembling it in this respect.’ His opponents, however, do not affirm resemblance in this respect,” the reply is: This is true, and it constitutes likeness in a particular respect. But the author has not established the possibility of a being existing without this particular likeness. Had he established that, he would have established the possibility of a being that is neither inside nor outside the world. Establishing this would have spared him the need for this premise. Instead, he merely claimed that not every being must have a likeness or counterpart in existence.

The term “likeness” is ambiguous, as he himself has mentioned. When a claim is ambiguous and may encompass the matter under dispute, something broader, or something narrower, establishing a proof for it does not refute the opponent. This is clear.

As for his arguments, he said: “The first argument is that rational intuition does not regard as implausible the existence of a being endowed with particular attributes, such that everything else differs from it in that respect. If this is not