nor can any rational person say, “I cannot conceive of this impossibility unless it has a counterpart.” For this would make his conceiving of it dependent on the existence of its counterpart, so that he could conceive of it if it had a counterpart. Yet whenever he allows that its counterpart could exist, he no longer regards the thing itself as impossible. If the person saying this believes it to be impossible, he cannot allow that it could itself exist, let alone that a counterpart to it could exist. If, however, he believes it to be possible, his conceiving of it does not require the existence of a counterpart.

Someone who knows neither whether it is impossible nor whether it is possible might, however, say this: “I cannot conceive of anything unless it has a counterpart.” This premise would refute that claim, had he established a sound argument for it.

To examine the matter precisely: if by the word “counterpart” this speaker means, “I cannot conceive of anything unless it has a counterpart in every respect,” this does not help him, for he concedes that Allah Most High has no counterpart in every respect. If he means, “Unless it has a counterpart in some respects,” in the sense that it shares some resemblance with something else, then al-Rāzī has offered no proof to refute this. Indeed, he has conceded in his books that everyone says this. He states in his book Nihāyat al-ʿuqūl—the most distinguished of his works on speculative theology—in the third discussion, concerning