universal proposition. Yet establishing its contradictory—that is, negating it—does not establish that Allah has no equal. For if it is not necessary for every existing thing to have a counterpart, it does not follow that every existing thing lacks a counterpart: denying necessity does not deny existence. Even if it were established that among existing things there is something that has no counterpart—indeed, something that necessarily has no counterpart—this unspecified claim alone would not establish that it is Allah, unless supported by further evidence. How much less, then, when all that has been established is that not every existing thing necessarily has a counterpart?

Once the substance of this premise is understood, all he has gained from it is his statement: “Thus, the claim is shown to be false that we cannot conceive of an existing being that is neither connected to the world nor separate from it unless we find a counterpart for it.”

If this is what he has gained from this premise, it should be understood that such a statement is not made by anyone who holds a definite position, nor by anyone whose views merit consideration. I know of no one with a recognized position who says this. Perhaps, however, it has been said by some who are ignorant of the various doctrines and their proofs, or by those beset by doubt and uncertainty concerning this matter. For his opponents hold that both self-evident reason and rational inquiry establish the impossibility of an existing being that is neither inside the world nor outside it. Since they regard this as impossible, they cannot allow that such an impossibility has a counterpart.