He also answered the arguments they advanced for its being a performative utterance.

He said: “As for their statement that it constituted divorce in the pre-Islamic era, this does not entail that they brought about divorce through it. It entails only that they dissolved the marital bond upon uttering it.

“It is therefore possible that the bond was dissolved because it was a performative utterance, as you claim, or because it was a lie, their custom being that anyone who made this false statement had his marital bond dissolved. This resembles their practice of treating a she-camel as forbidden once she had borne ten offspring, and similar practices.”

He said: “As for your assertion that it entails a temporary prohibition, and that this is precisely what a performative utterance does, unlike a factual statement—we do not concede that there is any prohibition at all. What the Quran establishes is the obligation to perform the expiation before intercourse, just as purification must precede prayer. Thus, when the Lawgiver says, ‘Do not pray until you have purified yourself,’ this does not indicate that prayer is forbidden to that person; rather, it prescribes an order of performance.

“Even if we concede that prohibition results from zihār, a prohibition following something may arise because the wording entails and signifies it. This is a performative utterance. But it may also be purely a punishment, as when killing results in deprivation of inheritance.

“Killing is not a performative utterance establishing a prohibition. Likewise, lying results in discretionary punishment and the loss of one’s standing as an upright person. These consequences follow by legal prescription, not through what the wording signifies.

“What defines a performative utterance is that its wording has been assigned to that legal effect and signifies it, as with contractual formulas. Thus, an utterance’s functioning as a cause is broader than its doing so performatively: it may function as a cause in some other way.

“Every performative utterance is therefore a cause, but not every cause is a performative utterance. Causality is broader, so its mere presence cannot establish that an utterance is performative, since the more general does not entail the more specific. The distinction between prohibition resulting from divorce and prohibition resulting from zihār is thus clear.”

He said: “As for your assertion that it is like pronouncing divorce, emancipation, sale, and the like, this is an analogy concerning causes, which we do not accept. Even if we conceded it, the explicit text of the Quran refutes it.”