If the two disputants among the members of this lineage mutually agreed to submit their case to the judge, he would nevertheless have no authority to hear the case between them or to rule for or against them, because his exclusion bars him from doing so. The naqib would have the stronger claim to hear the case if the dispute were confined to them and did not involve anyone else. If, however, the dispute extended beyond them—such as when a Talibid and an Abbasid were in dispute—the Talibid calling for judgment by his naqib and the Abbasid calling for judgment by his naqib—neither of them would be obliged to submit to the judgment of his naqib, since the opposing party lay outside his jurisdiction.
If both persisted in refusing to submit to either naqib, the two naqibs would meet, and each would bring the person under his authority before them. They would jointly hear the claim, but the respondent’s naqib, rather than the claimant’s, would adjudicate between them, because he is recommended to obtain from the members of his lineage the rights due to those entitled to them. If establishing the right depended on evidence to be heard against one of them, or on an oath that one of them was required to swear, the naqib of the person against whom the evidence was offered would hear it, rather than the naqib of the person in whose favor it was offered. Likewise, the naqib of the person taking the oath would administer it, rather than the naqib of the person demanding it, so that the adjudicator between them would be the respondent’s naqib, not the claimant’s.
If the two naqibs refused to meet, neither would be sinful in the first case, whereas both would be sinful in the second. The one bearing the graver sin would be the respondent’s naqib, since he alone was specifically charged with executing the judgment.
If the Talibid and the Abbasid mutually agreed to submit their case to one of the two naqibs, and one of their naqibs adjudicated between them, the matter would be examined as follows: if the adjudicator was the respondent’s naqib, his judgment would be valid, and the opposing party would have to abide by it. If the claimant’s naqib adjudicated between them, it could be held that his judgment should be enforced, or that it should be rejected.
If one of them presented evidence before the judge so that he might hear it against his opponent and transmit it in writing to his naqib, while the judge was barred from hearing cases between them, it would not be permissible for him to hear that evidence—even if he held that a judgment could be issued against an absent party. This is because his judgment would not be enforceable against a person against whom evidence was established even if he were present; a fortiori, it could not be enforced against him in his absence.
If a judge who held that judgment could be issued against an absent party wished to hear evidence against a man outside his jurisdiction, in order to transmit in writing to the judge of the man’s town what had been established before him by that evidence, this would be permissible. The distinction between the two cases is that if a person outside the judge’s jurisdiction appeared before him, the judge’s ruling would be enforceable against him; therefore, it is permissible for him to hear evidence against that person. As for the members of these two lineages, if either of them appeared before the judge, his ruling would not be enforceable against him. Therefore, it is not permissible for the judge to hear evidence against him.
If either of the members of these two lineages acknowledged before the judge that he owed the other a right, the judge could testify to that admission against him before his naqib, but he could not report it as a judicial ruling, because his judgment would not be enforceable against him.