These are five matters: First, adjudicating disputes among them. Second, guardianship over their orphans in matters concerning the property they own. Third, enforcing the fixed legal penalties upon them for the offenses they have committed. Fourth, arranging the marriages of their unmarried women whose guardians cannot be identified, or whose guardians are known but wrongfully prevent them from marrying. Fifth, placing under legal interdiction any among them who becomes insane or financially incompetent, and lifting the interdiction when he regains sanity or attains sound judgment.

With these five powers, the naqābah becomes general in scope. At that point, for his appointment to the office of naqābah and the establishment of his authority to be valid, he must be learned and qualified for independent legal reasoning, so that his judgments are valid and his judicial decisions enforceable.

Once his authority has been established, it must fall into one of two categories: either it includes excluding the judge from hearing cases involving them, or it does not. If his authority is completely general, does not include excluding the judge from hearing their cases, and the appointment of the naqīb to hear their cases does not itself require the judge to be excluded from them, then both the naqīb and the judge may hear their cases. The naqīb does so by virtue of the specific jurisdiction for which they appointed him, while the judge does so by virtue of his general jurisdiction, which brings them within its scope.

Whichever of the two adjudicates their disputes and quarrels, or arranges the marriages of their unmarried women, his ruling takes effect. Their respective roles in adjudicating the affairs of the members of this lineage are like those of two judges in a single town. Thus, whichever of the two rules in a dispute between parties under his jurisdiction, his ruling takes effect, and the other may not overturn it.

If two of them are in dispute and one calls for the naqīb’s judgment while the other calls for the judge’s judgment, some have held that the one who calls for the naqīb’s judgment has priority because of his specific jurisdiction. Others have said that the two are equal, making the case like that of disputants seeking adjudication from two judges in one town; in that event, the claimant’s preference prevails over that of the respondent. If they are equal, then the rule is as stated above: lots are cast between them, and the preference of whichever one is selected by lot is followed.

If the naqīb’s authority includes excluding the judge from hearing cases among the members of this lineage, the judge may not undertake to hear their cases, whether one of them petitions him or not. This differs from the case of two judges assigned to separate parts of a town. If a litigant from one part brings a claim before the judge of the other, that judge must summon the litigant’s opponent before him. This is because each judge’s jurisdiction is confined to his own locality. Thus, the one who comes into his district and the one residing there are treated alike, since both are counted among its people. The jurisdiction of the naqābah, however, is confined to a lineage whose status does not vary according to location.