Al-Ahkam al-SultaniyyahAl-Qadi Abu Ya’la Ibn al-Farra

If the complainant requests in his petition that the two parties be adjudicated between, the opposing party must be named and the dispute specified for jurisdiction over it to be valid. If the opposing party is not named and the dispute is not specified, the jurisdiction is invalid, since it is neither general jurisdiction that may be construed in its general sense nor specific jurisdiction, because the matter is unknown.

If the petitioner names his opponent and specifies the dispute, the directive granting his request is then examined. If it is phrased as an order, such as, “Grant him his request,” or, “Act in accordance with what he has requested,” his jurisdiction to adjudicate between them is valid by virtue of this directive. If, however, it is phrased as a description of the situation, and he writes, “Your view concerning granting his request is sound,” then in governmental and administrative practice this directive is treated as an order, since customarily it is used in that way. As for religious judgments, some jurists permitted this practice, relying on customary usage, and held the jurisdiction valid. Others denied its permissibility and the establishment of jurisdiction until it was accompanied by an order that establishes jurisdiction, relying on the meanings of the words.

Thus, if the petitioner had requested a directive authorizing adjudication between the two parties, but the authority wrote, “Grant him his request,” those who take customary usage into account would deem the jurisdiction valid by virtue of this directive. Those who consider the literal meanings of the words, however, would not deem the jurisdiction valid by it, because the petitioner requested a directive authorizing adjudication, not adjudication itself.

The second category of directives is one in which the directive refers to granting the litigant what he requested and expressly states the order entailed by that request. In this case, the content of the directive itself is what determines the scope of the jurisdiction. This category has three forms: one in which the directive is complete, one in which it is valid though incomplete, and one that lacks both qualities.

The directive is complete in establishing valid jurisdiction when it contains two things: first, an order to examine the case; and second, an order to adjudicate it. Thus, it may state: “Examine the case of the petitioner against his opponent, and adjudicate between them according to the truth and what the Sacred Law requires.” This is the most complete form of directive. If the words “according to the truth and what the Sacred Law requires” are omitted, it is still valid, because a judgment can only be rendered according to the truth required by the Sacred Law. Those words are included in directives as a description, not as a condition. When a directive combines both elements—examination and adjudication—it is complete, and by it the investiture and jurisdiction are valid.

As for the directive that is valid, though falling short of the complete form, it is one that contains an order to adjudicate without an order to examine the case. It may state, “Adjudicate between the petitioner in this case and his opponent,” or, “Judge between them.” Jurisdiction is valid by virtue of this, because adjudication can only take place after prior examination. The order to adjudicate therefore implicitly includes an order to examine, since adjudication cannot be separated from it.

وإن سَأَلَ الْمُتَظَلِّمُ فِي قِصَّتِهِ الْحُكْمَ بَيْنَهُمَا، فَلَا بد من أن يكون الخصم في القصة مُسَمًّى، وَالْخُصُومَةُ مَذْكُورَةً، لِتَصِحَّ الْوِلَايَةُ عَلَيْهَا، فَإِنْ لم يسم الخصم، ولم يذكر الْخُصُومَةُ لَمْ تَصِحَّ الْوِلَايَةُ، لِأَنَّهَا لَيْسَتْ وِلَايَةً عَامَّةً، فَيُحْمَلُ عَلَى عُمُومِهَا، وَلَا خَاصَّةً لِلْجَهْلِ بها. فإن سَمَّى رَافِعُ الْقِصَّةِ خَصْمَهُ وَذَكَرَ خُصُومَتَهُ، نُظِرَ فِي التَّوْقِيعِ بِإِجَابَتِهِ إلَى مُلْتَمَسِهِ فَإِنْ خَرَجَ مخرج الأمر فوقع " أجبه إلى ملتمسه" أو " اعمل بِمَا الْتَمَسَهُ" صَحَّتْ وِلَايَتُهُ فِي الْحُكْمِ بَيْنَهُمَا بهذا التَّوْقِيعُ. وَإِنْ خَرَجَ مَخْرَجَ الْحِكَايَةِ لِلْحَالِ، فَوَقَّعَ " رأيك في إجابته إلى ملتمسه موفقا". فَهَذَا التَّوْقِيعُ خَارِجٌ فِي الْأَعْمَالِ السُّلْطَانِيَّةِ مَخْرَجَ الْأَمْرِ، وَالْعُرْفُ بِاسْتِعْمَالِهِ فِيهَا مُعْتَادٌ. فَأَمَّا فِي الأحكام الدينية، فقد أجازه طائفة من الفقهاء، اعتبارا بالعرف فيه، وصحت الْوِلَايَةُ، وَمَنَعَتْ طَائِفَةٌ أُخْرَى مِنْ جَوَازِهِ، وَانْعِقَادِ الولاية، حتى يقترن به أمر تنعقد به الولاية، اعْتِبَارًا بِمَعَانِي الْأَلْفَاظِ. فَلَوْ كَانَ رَافِعُ الْقِصَّةِ سَأَلَ التَّوْقِيعَ بِالْحُكْمِ بَيْنَهُمَا فَوَقَّعَ بِإِجَابَتِهِ إلَى ملتمسه، فمن اعتبر العرف المعتاد صحح الولاية بهذا التوقيع. ومن اعتبر معاني الألفاظ لم يصحح بِهِ الْوِلَايَةُ، لِأَنَّهُ سَأَلَ التَّوْقِيعَ بِالْحُكْمِ، وَلَمْ يسأل الحكم. الحالة الثانية من التَّوْقِيعَاتِ: أَنْ يُحَالَ فِيهِ عَلَى إجَابَةِ الْخَصْمِ إلَى مَا سَأَلَ، وَيُسْتَأْنَفَ فِيهِ الْأَمْرُ بِمَا تَضَمَّنَهُ، فَيَصِيرُ مَا تَضَمَّنَهُ التَّوْقِيعُ هُوَ الْمُعْتَبَرُ في الولاية. وإذا كَانَ كَذَلِكَ فَلَهُ ثَلَاثَةُ أَحْوَالٍ: حَالُ كَمَالٍ، وحال جواز، وحال تخلو عن الأمرين: أما الحال الَّتِي يَكُونُ التَّوْقِيعُ فِيهَا كَمَالًا فِي صِحَّةِ الْوِلَايَةِ، فَهُوَ أَنْ يَتَضَمَّنَ شَيْئَيْنِ: أَحَدُهُمَا الْأَمْرُ بالنظر. والثاني: الأمر بالحكم فيه، فَيَذْكُرُ فِيهِ " اُنْظُرْ بَيْنَ رَافِعِ هَذِهِ الْقِصَّةِ وَبَيْنَ خَصْمِهِ، وَاحْكُمْ بَيْنَهُمَا بِالْحَقِّ، وَمُوجَبِ الشَّرْعِ". فهو أكمل التوقيعات. وإن لم يذكر في التوقيع " بالحق وموجب الشرع" جَازَ، لِأَنَّ الْحُكْمَ لَا يَكُونُ إلَّا بِالْحَقِّ الذي يوجبه حُكْمُ الشَّرْعِ. وَإِنَّمَا يَذْكُرُ ذَلِكَ فِي التَّوْقِيعَاتِ، وصفاً لا شرطاً. فإذا كان التَّوْقِيعُ جَامِعًا لِهَذَيْنِ الْأَمْرَيْنِ: مِنْ النَّظَرِ، وَالْحُكْمِ، فَهُوَ التَّوْقِيعُ الْكَامِلُ، وَيَصِحُّ بِهِ التَّقْلِيدُ وَالْوِلَايَةُ. وأما الحالة التي يكون التوقيع فيها جَائِزًا، مَعَ قُصُورِهِ عَنْ حَالِ الْكَمَالِ، فَهُوَ أن يتضمن الأمر بالحكم دون النظر فيه، فَيَذْكُرُ فِي تَوْقِيعِهِ " اُحْكُمْ بَيْنَ رَافِعِ هَذِهِ الْقِصَّةِ وَبَيْنَ خَصْمِهِ" أَوْ يَقُولُ " اقْضِ بَيْنَهُمَا" فتصح الولاية بذلك، لأن الحكم والقضاء لَا يَكُونُ إلَّا بَعْدَ تَقَدُّمِ النَّظَرِ، فَصَارَ الْأَمْرُ بِهِ مُتَضَمِّنًا لِلنَّظَرِ، لِأَنَّهُ لَا يَخْلُو منه.

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