Al-Ahkam al-SultaniyyahAl-Qadi Abu Ya’la Ibn al-Farra

a specific removal from adjudicating between them, not a general revocation of his jurisdiction over other matters. Since jurisdiction may be of two kinds—general or specific—it follows that removal from office may likewise be general or specific.

If he did not prohibit him in the directive from adjudicating between them when ordering him to investigate the facts and mediate between the two parties, one view holds that the directive should be understood in its general sense as permitting him to adjudicate between them, since ordering him to undertake one of the matters within his jurisdiction does not constitute a prohibition against undertaking the others. Another view holds that he is prohibited from adjudicating between them and restricted to what the directive specified—investigating the facts and mediating between them—because the purport of the directive indicates this.

The matter must then be examined further. If the directive concerns mediation, it is not necessary to report the outcome back to the issuing authority after the mediation. But if it concerns investigating the facts, he must report the outcome to the issuing authority, since the directive constitutes a request for information, and he is therefore required to respond to it. This is the ruling governing a directive addressed to someone who possesses jurisdiction.

As for the second situation—that is, when the directive is addressed to someone who has no jurisdiction, such as a jurist or a witness—the directive will fall into one of three categories: it may concern investigating the facts, mediation, or adjudication.

If the directive concerns investigating the facts, the recipient must investigate them and report whatever he may legitimately testify to, so that the issuing authority may adjudicate on its basis. If he reports something about which he may not legitimately testify, it is merely information upon which the issuing authority may not base a judgment. Nevertheless, the grievance adjudicator may treat it as one of the indications by which he determines which of the two litigants has the stronger position, through intimidation and more extensive investigation.

If the directive concerns mediation between the two parties, the recipient is not restricted to the particular terms specified in the directive, since mediation requires neither a formal appointment nor jurisdiction. Rather, specifying mediation serves to designate the mediator by the choice of the issuing authority and to compel the two litigants to appear before him. If the mediation leads to a settlement between them, he is not required to report it; he is a witness to the settlement, and whenever they summon him to testify, he must give his testimony. If the mediation does not lead to a settlement, he is a witness against them regarding whatever they admitted before him. He must report this to the grievance adjudicator if the two litigants return to lodge a grievance, but he is not required to report it if they do not return.

If the directive concerns adjudicating between them, this constitutes a grant of jurisdiction whose scope must be determined by the purport of the directive, so that his consideration of the case remains confined to what it requires. In that event, the directive may take one of two forms. The first is that it refers him to grant the litigant’s request. In that case, one considers what the litigant requested in his grievance, and the review is restricted to that request. If he requested mediation or an investigation of the facts, the directive requires that alone, and the review remains restricted to it. This is so whether the directive takes the form of an instruction, such as, “Grant him what he seeks,” or the form of a report or consultation, such as, “What is your view concerning granting him his request?” In either case, it is regarded as a directive, because it does not entail a jurisdiction whose ruling must be enforced, and the matter is therefore less consequential.

هل عُمُومِ وِلَايَتِهِ فِيمَا عَدَاهَا، لِأَنَّهُ لَمَّا جَازَ أن تكون الولاية نوعين: عامة، أو خاصة. جاز أن يكون العزل عَامًّا وَخَاصًّا. وَإِنْ لَمْ يَنْهَهُ فِي التَّوْقِيعِ عن الحكم بينهما حين أمره بالكشف والوساطة، فقد قيل: إن نظرة عَلَى عُمُومِهِ فِي جَوَازِ حُكْمِهِ بَيْنَهُمَا، لِأَنَّ أَمْرَهُ بِبَعْضِ مَا إلَيْهِ لَا يَكُونُ مَنْعًا من غيره. وقيل: يَكُونُ مَمْنُوعًا مِنْ الْحُكْمِ بَيْنَهُمَا، مَقْصُورًا عَلَى مَا تَضَمَّنَهُ التَّوْقِيعُ مِنْ الْكَشْفِ وَالْوَسَاطَةِ، لِأَنَّ فَحَوَى التَّوْقِيعِ دَلِيلٌ عَلَيْهِ. ثُمَّ يُنْظَرُ، فَإِنْ كان التوقيع بالوساطة، لم يلزم إنْهَاءُ الْحَالِ إلَيْهِ بَعْدَ الْوَسَاطَةِ، وَإِنْ كَانَ يكشف الصورة لزمه إنهاء حالها إلَيْهِ، لِأَنَّهُ اسْتِخْبَارٌ مِنْهُ، فَلَزِمَهُ إجَابَتُهُ عَنْهُ. فَهَذَا حُكْمُ تَوْقِيعِهِ إلَى مَنْ لَهُ الْوِلَايَةُ. فأما الْحَالَةُ الثَّانِيَةُ، وَهُوَ أَنْ يُوَقِّعَ إلَى مَنْ لَا وِلَايَةَ لَهُ، كَتَوْقِيعِهِ إلَى فَقِيهٍ، أَوْ شَاهِدٍ فَلَا يَخْلُو حَالُ تَوْقِيعِهِ مِنْ ثَلَاثَةِ أحوال: إما أن يكون بكشف الصورة، أو يكون بالوساطة، أو بِالْحُكْمِ. فَإِنْ كَانَ التَّوْقِيعُ بِكَشْفِ الصُّورَةِ، فَعَلَيْهِ أَنْ يَكْشِفَهَا، وَيُنْهِيَ مِنْهَا مَا يَصِحُّ أَنْ يَشْهَدَ بِهِ، لِيَجُوزَ لِلْمُوَقِّعِ أَنْ يَحْكُمَ بِهِ؛ فَإِنْ أَنْهَى مَا لَا يَجُوزُ أَنْ يَشْهَدَ يه، كَانَ خَبَرًا لَا يَجُوزُ أَنْ يَحْكُمَ بِهِ الْمُوَقِّعُ، وَلَكِنْ يَجْعَلُهُ فِي نَظَرِ الْمَظَالِمِ مِنْ الْأَمَارَاتِ الَّتِي يَغْلِبُ بِهَا حَالُ أَحَدِ الْخَصْمَيْنِ في الإرهاب وفضل الكشف. وإن كان التوقيع بالوساطة بينهما لم يَقِفْ عَلَى مَا تَضَمَّنَهُ التَّوْقِيعُ مِنْ تَخْصِيصِ الْوَسَاطَةِ، لِأَنَّ الْوَسَاطَةَ لَا تَفْتَقِرُ إلَى تَقْلِيدٍ ولا ولاية، وإنما يقيد بِالْوَسَاطَةِ تَعْيِينَ الْوَسِيطِ بِاخْتِيَارِ الْمُوَقِّعِ، وَقَوَدِ الْخَصْمَيْنِ إليه إجباراً. فإذا أَفْضَتْ الْوَسَاطَةُ إلَى صُلْحِ الْخَصْمَيْنِ لَمْ يَلْزَمْهُ إنهاؤها، وكان شاهداً فيها، متى استدعوه لِلشَّهَادَةِ أَدَّاهَا، وَإِنْ لَمْ تُفْضِ الْوَسَاطَةُ إلَى صُلْحِهِمَا كَانَ شَاهِدًا عَلَيْهِمَا فِيمَا اعْتَرَفَا بِهِ عِنْدَهُ، يُؤَدِّيهِ إلَى النَّاظِرِ فِي الْمَظَالِمِ، إنْ عَادَ الْخَصْمَانِ إلَى التَّظَلُّمِ، وَلَا يَلْزَمُهُ أَدَاؤُهُ إنْ لَمْ يَعُودَا. وَإِنْ كَانَ التَّوْقِيعُ بِالْحُكْمِ بَيْنَهُمَا، فَهَذِهِ وِلَايَةٌ يُرَاعَى فِيهَا مَعَانِي التَّوْقِيعِ، ليكون نظره محمولا على ما يوجبه. وإذا كان كذلك فللتوقيع حالتان: إحداهما: أَنْ يُحَالَ بِهِ عَلَى إجَابَةِ الْخَصْمِ إلَى ملتمسه، فيعتبر حينئذ فيه مَا سَأَلَ الْخَصْمُ فِي ظُلَامَتِهِ، وَيَصِيرُ النَّظَرُ مقصورا عليه، فإن سأل الوساطة، أو كشف الصورة، كَانَ التَّوْقِيعُ مُوجِبًا لَهُ، وَكَانَ النَّظَرُ مَقْصُورًا عليه، سواء خَرَجَ التَّوْقِيعُ مَخْرَجَ الْأَمْرِ، كَقَوْلِهِ: أَجِبْهُ إلَى ما يلتمسه، أَوْ خَرَجَ مَخْرَجَ الْحِكَايَةِ، كَقَوْلِهِ: رَأْيُكَ فِي إجَابَتِهِ إلَى مُلْتَمَسِهِ، كَانَ مُوَقَّعًا، لِأَنَّهُ لَا يقتضي ولاية يلزم حكمها، وكان أمرها أخف.

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