the basis and implications of the right. He may not adjudicate between them on grounds that judges and qadis would not accept. The rulings issued in grievance cases may sometimes become confused to those who hear them, leading them to exercise excessive latitude in their judgments and go beyond what is permissible in such matters.

The Difference Between the Proceedings of the Official Overseeing Grievances and Those of Judges

Some scholars have mentioned ten differences between the proceedings of the official overseeing grievances and those of judges.

First: The official overseeing grievances possesses greater prestige and coercive authority than judges do in restraining litigants from mutual denial and preventing wrongdoers from overpowering and grappling with one another.

Second: Proceedings in grievance cases move from the narrow confines of obligation to the broader scope of permissibility. Thus, the official overseeing them has wider latitude and broader discretion.

Third: He may employ greater intimidation and uncover the facts through indicative signs and apparent circumstantial evidence—means that are unavailable to judges—thereby arriving at the truth and distinguishing the false claimant from the one in the right.

Fourth: He may confront one whose wrongdoing is manifest with disciplinary action, and correct and reform one whose hostility is evident.

Fifth: When the circumstances of the litigants’ cases are unclear, he has the latitude to delay and repeatedly recall them in order to investigate their causes and circumstances thoroughly. Judges do not have this latitude: when one of the two litigants asks a judge to issue a ruling, the judge may not delay it, whereas the official overseeing grievances may do so.

Sixth: When the litigants’ dispute becomes intractable, he may refer them to the mediation of trustworthy persons so that they may settle their dispute amicably by mutual consent. A judge may do this only when both litigants agree to the referral.

Seventh: When signs of mutual denial are clear, he may require both litigants to remain in attendance, and may require a guarantee in matters for which surety is legally admissible, so that the litigants submit to equitable dealing and abandon mutual denial and mutual accusations of lying.

Eighth: He may accept testimony from persons whose uprightness has not been publicly established, in a manner exceeding the judges’ customary practice of accepting testimony only from those whose probity has been formally attested.

Ninth: When he has doubts about witnesses, he may have them swear oaths if they voluntarily offer to do so, and he may seek a larger number of witnesses, so that his doubt is removed and his misgivings dispelled. Judges do not have this authority.

Tenth: He may initiate the summoning of witnesses and ask them what they know concerning the dispute between the litigants.

These ten points distinguish the proceedings of the official overseeing grievances from those of judges in disputes and litigation. We shall explain, in detailing them, what clarifies the general formulation of these differences between the two.