The first is that the appointing authority know the appointee and know that he possesses the qualifications permitting his appointment. If he does not know that the appointee possesses the qualifications required for that office, the appointment is invalid. If he comes to know of them after the appointment, he must make a new appointment and may not rely on the earlier one.

The second is that the appointing authority know that the appointee possesses the qualifications that entitle him to the office.

The third is specifying what the appointment entails—whether the judgeship, governorship of a region, or collection of the land tax—so that the scope on which the appointment was concluded may be known.

The fourth is specifying the territories over which the authority is conferred. If the appointment is made without this being known, it is invalid. For the exercise of the office to become binding, an additional condition is required beyond the conditions for forming the contract: the appointment must be publicly announced among the people under his jurisdiction, so that they submit to his authority and comply with his judgment. This is a condition for obedience to become obligatory, but not a condition for the judgment to take effect.

Once the appointment is valid in the manner we have described, it has been said that the relationship between the appointing authority and the appointee is analogous to agency, since both involve deputization. Remaining in office is therefore not binding upon the appointee: the appointing authority may dismiss him whenever he wishes, and the appointee may resign whenever he wishes. Nevertheless, it is preferable for the appointing authority to dismiss him only for a valid excuse, and for the officeholder to resign only for an excuse, because this office entails rights belonging to the Muslims.

It has also been said that the appointing authority may not dismiss him so long as he continues to meet the requisite conditions, because through the appointment he becomes responsible for overseeing the Muslims in their interests, rather than acting merely as a deputy of the imam. This differs from the principal, who may dismiss his agent, because the agent acts only with respect to the principal’s particular interests.

In a report transmitted by Yusuf ibn Musa, Ahmad was asked about an imam who had been removed: “May he lead the people in the Friday prayer?” He replied, “There is no harm in that. Hasan used to instruct someone to lead the people in prayer during the turmoil of al-Muhallab.”

The apparent implication is that he permitted his removal, since he did not object to the question about removing him. More likely, what was intended was removal from the office of the caliphal imamate, because he cited Hasan’s conduct in the incident involving al-Muhallab.

If he is dismissed or resigns, the termination of his office must be publicly announced, just as his appointment had to be publicly announced, so that he does not proceed to enforce a judgment and so that no litigant is misled into bringing a case before him. If he issues a judgment after being dismissed, while knowing of his dismissal, the judgment does not take effect. If he issues a judgment without knowing that he has been dismissed, there are two views as to whether it takes effect, based on the case of an agent who acts after revocation of his agency but before learning of it.

If the judge’s jurisdiction is general, his remit encompasses ten functions. The first is adjudicating disputes, ending quarrels and litigation—either through a settlement by mutual consent or by compelling the parties through a conclusive judgment.

The second is enforcing rights against those who refuse to render them and delivering them to their rightful recipients, once entitlement has been established through an admission or legally probative evidence. He may not issue a judgment on the basis of his own knowledge.