If the condition concerns a specific ruling, the same consideration applies. If it is not framed as a condition but as a command—for example, if he says, “qad wallaytuka: I have appointed you; impose retaliation on a slave for killing a free person and on a Muslim for killing a non-Muslim”—then the condition is void and the appointment contract is valid. But if he makes it a condition, does the contract become invalid? There are two reports on this, based on the ruling concerning a sale accompanied by a defective condition.
If it takes the form of a prohibition, then if he prohibits the judge from adjudicating cases involving retaliation against a Muslim for killing a non-Muslim or against a free person for killing a slave, and prohibits him from ruling in such cases either that retaliation is obligatory or that it is to be waived, this is permissible, because he has limited his authority to matters other than these. If, however, he does not prohibit him from adjudicating such cases, but prohibits him from issuing a judgment of qiṣāṣ (retaliation), it is possible that this amounts to excluding such cases from his jurisdiction, so that he may neither rule that retaliation is due nor that it is waived. It is also possible that the prohibition does not entail excluding them from his jurisdiction, in which case the ruling applicable to a command applies: the command has no binding effect, while his exercise of independent legal reasoning remains valid, provided that this was not made a condition of his appointment. He must then rule according to what his independent legal reasoning leads him to.
Appointment to the judgeship is concluded, when the parties are present, through direct oral communication; when the appointee is absent, it is concluded through correspondence or written communication. The expressions by which an appointment to office is concluded are of two types: explicit and allusive.
The four explicit expressions are: qad wallaytuka (“I have appointed you”), qalladtuka (“I have invested you with authority”), istakhl aftuka (“I have appointed you as my deputy”), and istanabtuka (“I have deputized you”). If any one of these expressions is used, the appointment to the judgeship, as well as to other offices, is concluded by it, and no contextual indication is required.
As for the allusive expressions, it has been said that there are seven: qad iʿtamadtu ʿalayka (“I have relied upon you”), ʿawwalktu ʿalayka (“I have depended upon you”), radadtu ilayka (“I have referred the matter to you”), jaʿaltu ilayka (“I have assigned it to you”), fawwaḍtu ilayka (“I have delegated it to you”), wakkaltu ilayka (“I have authorized you”), and asn adtu ilayka (“I have entrusted it to you”). If a contextual indication accompanies one of these expressions, it assumes the status of an explicit formula—for example, saying: “Consider what I have entrusted to you, and judge in the matter concerning which I have relied upon you.”
If the appointment is made orally in person, acceptance must be expressed immediately and verbally. If it is made through correspondence or in writing, acceptance may be delayed. If the appointee does not verbally express acceptance, but begins examining cases, it is possible that this may be treated as equivalent to verbal acceptance; it is also possible that it may not, because beginning to examine cases is consequent upon the appointment contract and therefore cannot itself constitute acceptance of the appointment.
The validity of the appointment depends on conditions: