The second is that in both offices one may address matters connected with the public interest and seek to denounce manifest wrongdoing.

As for the distinction between them, it rests on two respects. The first is that the Court of Grievances is intended to address matters beyond the capacity of judges, whereas ḥisbah is intended to address matters from which judges have been relieved. Accordingly, the rank of the Court of Grievances is higher, while the jurisdiction of ḥisbah is more specific. The officer of the Court of Grievances may issue directives to judges and muḥtasibs, whereas a judge may not issue directives to the officer of the Court of Grievances, though he may issue them to the muḥtasib; and the muḥtasib may not issue directives to either of them. This is one distinction.

The second is that the officer of the Court of Grievances may adjudicate, whereas the officer of ḥisbah may not.

Once this has been established, ḥisbah comprises enjoining what is right and forbidding what is wrong. Enjoining what is right is divided into three categories: first, what relates to the limits prescribed by Allah Most High; second, what relates to the rights of human beings; and third, what is shared between the two.

What relates to the rights of Allah Most High is of two types. The first is that which must be enjoined upon the community collectively, but not upon individuals separately—for example, failing to hold the Friday prayer in an inhabited town. If they constitute a number upon whom the validity of the Friday prayer is agreed, such as forty or more, then it is his duty to compel them to hold it and to discipline them for neglecting it.

If, however, they constitute a number concerning whom there is disagreement as to whether the Friday prayer is valid with them, then he and they have four possible situations. The first is that his opinion and the opinion of the people agree that the Friday prayer is valid with that number. In that case, he must command them to hold it, and they must hasten to comply with his command. His disciplining them for neglecting it should be more lenient than his disciplining them for neglecting an obligation whose establishment is confirmed by consensus.

The second situation is that his opinion and the opinion of the people agree that the Friday prayer is not valid with them. In that case, he may not command them to hold it; rather, if they were to hold it, he would have greater right to forbid them from doing so.

The third situation is that the people consider the Friday prayer valid with them, while the muḥtasib does not. He may neither oppose them in this matter nor command them to hold it, since he does not consider it valid. Nor may he forbid them from it or prevent them from doing what they believe to be obligatory upon them.

The fourth situation is that the muḥtasib considers the Friday prayer valid with them, while the people do not. Their continued neglect of it, despite the passage of a long period, the growing interval, and the large and increasing number of people, would result in the Friday prayer being abandoned altogether. May the muḥtasib therefore command them to hold it in view of this consideration? The apparent meaning of Aḥmad’s statement—may Allah have mercy on him—is that he may not command them to hold it.