That is the first of the two respects in which it agrees with judicial rulings. The second is that its officer may compel the defendant to discharge the obligation incumbent upon him. This does not apply to every right; rather, it is limited to those rights in respect of which he may hear a claim when they have been established by acknowledgment and the person concerned has the ability to discharge them, because delaying them constitutes a wrong that he has been appointed to remove.
As for the two respects in which ḥisbah falls short of judicial rulings, the first is that it does not extend to hearing claims generally when they do not concern manifest wrongs—claims relating to contracts and transactions, as well as all other rights and demands. He may not be assigned to hear such claims, nor may he adjudicate them, whether they involve substantial or minor rights—even a single dirham or less—unless an explicit text refers such matters to him, thereby extending the unrestricted remit of ḥisbah. In that case it is permissible, and by virtue of this added authority he combines judicial office with ḥisbah. It must then be ensured that he is qualified for independent legal reasoning. If his appointment is limited to the unrestricted remit of ḥisbah, judges and judicial authorities have a stronger claim to examine such matters, whether minor or major. This is the first respect.
The second is that ḥisbah is restricted to rights that have been acknowledged. When a right is denied and disputed, he may not examine the matter, because the judge must hear evidence and administer an oath. The muḥtasib may neither hear evidence to establish a right nor administer an oath negating one; judges and judicial authorities, by virtue of hearing evidence and administering oaths to litigants, are more suited to this task.
As for the two respects in which ḥisbah exceeds judicial rulings, the first is that its officer may investigate matters involving the good he commands and the wrong he forbids, even when no opposing party is present to bring a complaint. A judge, however, may not address such matters unless a party is present whose claim he is authorized to hear. If a judge were to do so, he would have exceeded the jurisdiction of his office and transgressed the proper bounds of his authority.
The second is that the officer of ḥisbah possesses, in matters relating to wrongs, a degree of state authority and coercive power on the part of enforcers that judges do not possess. Ḥisbah is founded upon intimidation; therefore, for the muḥtasib to confront such matters with authority and sternness is neither an overreach nor a violation of its proper bounds. Judicial office, by contrast, is founded upon equitable adjudication, and is therefore more properly characterized by deliberation and dignity.
As for the relationship between ḥisbah and the Court of Grievances, there is between them a close resemblance as well as a meaningful distinction. The common resemblance between them rests on two respects. The first is that both are grounded in the awe associated with state authority and the force of forthright action.