Al-Khiraqī said: “Taʿzīr must not reach the level of a fixed legal penalty. The lowest of the fixed penalties is forty lashes if we hold that the fixed penalty for drinking wine is eighty. But if we hold that it is forty, then its lowest amount is twenty lashes in the case of a slave.”
If someone steals less than the nisab from a secure place appropriate for property of that kind, or steals the nisab from a place that is not secure, he must pay twice its value. He explicitly stated this with regard to the theft of hanging fruit. He also said, in the narration of Ibn Manṣūr, concerning concealed lost property: “If you waive amputation in his case, he must pay a fine equal to its value.”
If he gathers property inside a secure place but it is recovered from him before he removes it; or if he breaches the secure place and enters but takes nothing; or if he breaches it but neither enters nor takes anything; or if he attempts to breach it; or if he attempts to open a door but does not do so—then he is subjected to taʿzīr approaching the lowest fixed penalty, but it must not reach it. Aḥmad said, in the narration of Abū Ṭālib: “If he gathers it in the house and rolls it into a bundle but does not take it out, he is disciplined but his hand is not amputated. If he takes the garment and tears it, his hand is amputated and he is flogged.”
Other than these two offences—that is, adultery and theft—taʿzīr must not reach the lowest fixed penalty. We have already cited his statement concerning one who slanders another verbally, saying, “O wrongdoer, O usurer, O liar”: he is disciplined with between three and ten lashes. This discussion concerns one of the respects in which taʿzīr differs from the fixed penalties.
The second respect is that a fixed penalty may not be pardoned, nor is intercession permissible concerning it. Is pardon permissible in the case of taʿzīr, and may intercession be made concerning it? I considered the matter: if the taʿzīr relates to an individual’s right and he pardons that right, his pardon is valid. In the narration of al-Athram, he said concerning a man who accused another of fornication and brought him before the ruler: “Does he have the right to pardon him after bringing him before the ruler?” He replied: “If the accusation was against him personally, it is his right; but if he accused his father, it is something he is seeking on behalf of someone else.”
Thus, he permitted pardon after the case had been brought before the ruler when the matter involved an individual’s right, but disallowed it when the son pardoned something that had been his father’s right. Ibn Manṣūr transmitted from him: “If he slandered his father, who had died, and his son pardoned him, he said: ‘His pardon is valid.’” Here, this is understood to mean that the slander against the father occurred after his death, so the right became attached to the son. For this reason, we say that if someone accuses his mother of fornication after she has died, the right to bring the claim belongs to her son.