As for collecting these dues from the officials, if they were kharāj payable into the public treasury, no endorsement from the ruler was required; the treasurer’s acknowledgment that he had received them was proof that the officials had been discharged from liability for them. As for the treasurer’s handwriting, when considered independently of his acknowledgment, the same ruling we stated above concerning the officials’ handwriting applies: it constitutes evidence.
If, however, they were kharāj belonging to the public treasury but not payable into it, the officials would not be credited with them except on the basis of the ruler’s endorsement. Once its authenticity had been established, that endorsement was compelling evidence that payment was permissible. As for crediting the endorsement itself, one possibility is that this should depend on the acknowledgment of the rights-holder in whose favor it was made that he had received what it specified, since the endorsement is evidence that payment was made to him, but not evidence that he actually took possession of it.
Another possibility is that it may be credited to the official against the public treasury’s dues. If the rights-holder in whose favor the endorsement was made denied receiving the payment, he would bring the official before a judge over the matter, and the official would be required to produce evidence against him. If he had no evidence, the rights-holder would be required to swear an oath, and the official would be held liable for the amount. This latter view is more characteristic of dīwān custom, while the former is closer to sound fiqh analysis.
If the dīwān official had doubts about the endorsement, he would not credit it to the official under either possibility until he presented it to the signatory. If the signatory acknowledged it, it was valid, and the crediting would proceed as stated above; but if he denied it, it would not be credited to the official.
The basis of the kharāj would then be examined. If it was tied to something present and extant, the official could seek recovery from it; but if it concerned sources from which recovery was impossible, he could ask that the signatory be required to swear to his denial. If the validity of the kharāj was not known, the official could not have the signatory put to oath—neither according to the administrative custom of the sultanate nor under judicial procedure. If the validity of the kharāj was known, then according to the custom of the sultanate he was barred from requiring the signatory to swear, whereas under judicial procedure his request would be granted.
As for the third duty, namely registering the written returns (ruqūʿ), they fall into three categories: land-survey returns; receipts and collection reports; and disbursement and expenditure reports.
As for the survey and work returns, if their underlying figures had been established in the dīwān, the correctness of the claim would be checked by comparing it with the original entry, and it would be entered in the dīwān if it agreed with it. If the dīwān contained no underlying entries for them, their registration would be based on the statement of the person submitting them.
As for the receipts and collection reports, their registration is based solely on the statement of the person submitting them, because he is acknowledging something against himself rather than asserting a claim in his own favor. As for the tax and expenditure reports, their submitter is a claimant to them, so his claim is not accepted except on the basis of conclusive evidence. If he cites endorsements from the rulers, they must be scrutinized, and the ruling concerning them follows what we have already explained regarding the legal effects of endorsements.