the rights of the public treasury. If the assessments were established during his tenure in lands newly conquered or in uncultivated lands whose cultivation had just begun, he was to record them in the dīwān of the district and in the comprehensive dīwān of the public treasury, in accordance with the ruling established in both. If the established assessments in those lands predated his tenure, he was to rely on the records made by the trustworthy scribes, provided that he trusted their handwriting, and on what he had received from their trustees under their seals.

Written records meeting these conditions were sufficient to justify relying upon and acting on them in matters of dīwān assessments and state dues, even though they would not suffice for judicial rulings and testimony, in view of the established custom governing such matters. This is like the permissibility for a hadith scholar to transmit what he finds in his written record of audition when it is in handwriting he trusts. Judicial rulings and testimony, however, concern private rights that are frequently directly handled and discharged, so retaining them in memory does not impose undue difficulty. For this reason, it is not permissible to rely on mere handwriting in such matters. Dīwān records, by contrast, concern public rights that are seldom directly handled despite their wide dissemination, making it difficult to retain them in memory; therefore, reliance on mere handwriting is permissible in their case. The same applies to hadith transmission. There are differing reports from Ahmad concerning a witness who recognizes his own handwriting, and a judge who finds a ruling in his register, as to whether judgment and testimony may be based on it.

As for the second duty—collecting dues in full—it has two aspects. The first is collecting them from those among the officials upon whom they are due, and the second is collecting them from the officials who received them. As for collecting them from those liable for them, this is handled on the basis of the officials’ acknowledgment that they received them. As for relying on the officials’ handwriting acknowledging their receipt of them, the position of the dīwān scribes is that once the handwriting is identified, it constitutes proof of receipt, whether the official acknowledges that it is his handwriting or denies it, provided that it is compared with his known handwriting. The position of the jurists, however, is that if the official does not acknowledge that it is his handwriting or denies it, he is not bound by it, and it is not proof that he received the funds. His handwriting may not be compared with his known writing in order to impose liability upon him by force; rather, it may be compared only to pressure him into acknowledging it voluntarily. If he acknowledges the handwriting but denies having received the funds, then, specifically with regard to state dues, it constitutes proof in favor of those who made the payment and proof against the collecting officials that they received it, in view of the established custom.