and had been overseeing it. If it was an office in which joint oversight was not valid, the appointment of the second official constituted the dismissal of the first. If it was an office in which joint oversight was valid, the prevailing custom governing it was taken into consideration. If custom did not permit joint oversight, the appointment of the second official constituted the dismissal of the first. But if custom permitted joint oversight, the second appointment did not constitute the dismissal of the first; rather, both would be administrators of the office and overseers of it.

If a supervisor was appointed over them, the administrator would directly carry out the work, while the supervisor would exercise comprehensive oversight of it, preventing the administrator from adding to it, reducing it, or taking it over exclusively. The position of the supervisor differs from that of the barīd official in three respects. First, the administrator may not act independently of the supervisor in carrying out the work, whereas he may act independently of the barīd official. Second, the supervisor may prevent the administrator from proceeding with whatever he has corrupted, whereas the barīd official has no such authority. Third, the supervisor is not required to report what the administrator has done—whether valid or invalid—once the administrator has ceased doing it. The barīd official, however, is required to report whatever the administrator has done, whether valid or invalid. This is because the supervisor’s report is a complaint calling for action, whereas the barīd official’s report is a formal notification.

The difference between a notification report and a complaint report is twofold. First, a notification report includes both invalid and valid actions, whereas a complaint report concerns only invalid actions and not valid ones. Second, a notification report covers both matters from which the administrator has retracted and matters from which he has not retracted, whereas a complaint report concerns only matters from which he has not retracted and not those from which he has retracted.

If the administrator denies the supervisor’s complaint or the barīd official’s notification, neither man’s statement is accepted against him until it is supported by proof. If the two of them jointly submit the complaint and notification, they are treated as two witnesses, and their statement is accepted against him provided they are trustworthy and no hostility or dispute is apparent among them.

If the administrator is required to submit an account of what he has administered, he must submit one in the administration of kharāj, but he is not required to do so in the administration of ʿushr, because kharāj is disbursed to the public treasury, whereas ʿushr is disbursed to the recipients of alms.

According to Abū Ḥanīfa, an account must be submitted for both funds, because, in his view, their disbursement destination is shared. If the ʿushr administrator claims to have disbursed the ʿushr to those entitled to it, his statement is accepted in that regard. But if the kharāj administrator claims to have delivered the kharāj to those entitled to it, his statement is not accepted unless it is corroborated or established by evidence.

If the administrator wishes to appoint a deputy for his office, there are two possibilities. The first is that he appoints someone who will independently oversee the office without him. This is impermissible, because it is equivalent to replacing himself, and he has no right to replace himself with another, even though he may dismiss himself. The second is that he appoints an assistant. In that case, the terms of his appointment must be considered, and it must fall into one of three situations: