This indicates that he has no right to exercise control over anything beyond his forecourt. As for the protected precincts of mosques and congregational mosques, the matter is considered as follows: if making use of them would harm those who worship in the mosques, the users must be barred, and the ruler may not authorize it, because the worshippers have a greater right to them. If it would not cause harm, then making use of their precincts is permissible. Does this require the ruler’s permission? This may be analyzed according to the two positions regarding the protected precincts of properties.
Ahmad said, according to the narration of al-Marwazi, concerning a man who digs in the forecourt of a mosque, where there is a well for water in the middle of the mosque: “I do not approve of his digging there; but if he digs, the well should be filled in.”
The third category is what is set aside for the forecourts of streets and roads. If its use would harm passersby because the road is narrow, they must be barred from it, and the ruler may not authorize it. If it would not cause harm because the road is spacious, there are two reports. According to the first, it is prohibited.
In the narration of Ishaq ibn Ibrahim, he was asked about a man who sells his goods on a broad road: “May one buy from him if he cannot find what he needs elsewhere?” He replied: “Who is free from this? Selling on the road is disliked.” In another place he said: “One should not sell anything on the Muslims’ road,” and he strongly disapproved of it.
According to the second report, it is permissible. In the narration of Harb, Ahmad was asked about a man who reaches the market stalls before others. He replied: “If no one has a prior claim to it, whoever reaches it first in the morning has the right to it until nightfall.” He said: “This was how things were done in the market of Medina in former times.”
Does this require the ruler’s permission? This too may be analyzed according to the two positions. The apparent meaning of his statement in the narration of Harb is that he did not consider such permission necessary. If we do consider it necessary, then the matter falls under independent legal reasoning: the ruler restrains them from transgression, reconciles them when they dispute, seats whoever he chooses, bars whoever he chooses to bar, and gives precedence to whoever he chooses to advance—just as he exercises independent legal reasoning regarding the funds of the public treasury and the granting of uncultivated land. On this basis, he does not make the first person to arrive more entitled to the place merely by arriving first. He may not charge a fee for sitting there.
If he leaves them to resolve the matter by mutual consent, the first person to occupy a place has a greater right to it than the person who arrives after him. Once he leaves, however, he and everyone else have equal rights to it on the following day; the prior occupant is given consideration only in accordance with the apparent meaning of Ahmad’s statement in the narration of Harb. For if he had a permanent right to it, the matter would have passed from mere permissibility into the status of ownership.
As for scholars and jurists sitting in congregational mosques and other mosques and taking up teaching and issuing fatwas, each of them must exercise self-restraint and not undertake what he is unqualified to do, lest one seeking guidance be led astray by him and one seeking right direction stumble because of him. A traditional saying states: “The most audacious of you in issuing fatwas is the most audacious of you in plunging into the depths of Hell.”
Ahmad said, according to the narration of Salih: “When a man takes it upon himself to issue fatwas, he should be knowledgeable about the various aspects of the Quran, knowledgeable about sound chains of transmission, and knowledgeable about the Sunnah.”