The minister is removed from office upon the caliph’s death, even if the emir is not thereby removed, because the ministry is a representation on behalf of the Muslims. This, then, is the ruling governing the general emirate—namely, the emirate of istikfāʾ (general delegated authority), conferred through selection and prior appointment.
As for the specific emirate, it is one in which the emir’s authority is confined to managing the armies, governing the subjects, protecting the realm, and defending its inviolable interests. He may not intervene in judicial proceedings or rulings, nor in the collection of the land tax or alms.
As for enforcing the ḥudūd (fixed legal punishments), if a case requires independent legal reasoning because of disagreement among the jurists, or requires the establishment of evidence because the disputing parties deny the charge, he may not undertake to enforce it, since such matters fall among the judicial rulings outside the specific scope of his emirate.
If it requires neither independent legal reasoning nor evidence—or if it requires both, but the judge has exercised independent legal reasoning in the matter or evidence has been established before him—the matter is then examined. If it concerns rights belonging to individuals, such as the ḥadd for slander or qiṣāṣ (retaliation) for a life or limb, the matter is determined by the claimant’s preference. If he turns from the emir to the judge, the judge has the stronger claim to enforce it on his behalf, since it falls among the rights whose enforcement judges are recommended to undertake.
If, however, the claimant chooses this emir to enforce the ḥadd or qiṣāṣ, the emir has the stronger claim to enforce it, because this is not a judicial ruling; it is merely assistance in securing a right. The one responsible for providing that assistance—the emir—is therefore more entitled to enforce it. For it is not adjudication, but assistance in securing a right, and the one responsible for such assistance is the emir rather than the judge.
If this ḥadd, however, is purely one of Allah’s rights, such as the ḥadd for zinā (unlawful sexual intercourse)—flogging or stoning—the emir has the stronger claim to enforce it than the judge. It falls within the laws of governance, the duties of protection, and the defense of the faith; it therefore belongs among the rights of the emirate and is removed from them only by an explicit text, whereas it falls outside the rights of the judiciary and enters them only by an explicit text.
As for his handling of grievances, if they concern matters in which judgments have already been rendered and confirmed by judges and governors, he may oversee their enforcement, assisting the rightful party against the wrongdoer and wresting the right from one who acknowledges it but procrastinates in fulfilling it. He is entrusted with preventing people from wronging and overpowering one another, and is recommended to promote mutual compassion and equitable dealing.
If, however, the grievances are cases in which judgment must be initiated afresh and adjudication begun, this emir is barred from hearing them, because they are judicial matters not included in the contract of his emirate. He must refer the parties to the judge of their town. If that judge issues a rightful judgment in favor of one of them, the emir shall enforce it if the judge is unable to do so.
If there is no just judge in their town, he should direct both parties to the nearest judge in another town, provided that going there does not cause them hardship. If it would, he is not to require them to do so; rather, he should seek the caliph’s instruction regarding their dispute and carry out the caliph’s ruling on it.
As for organizing the pilgrims’ journey from his jurisdiction, that falls within the scope of his emirate, because it is one of the forms of assistance to which he is recommended.