Hence, one must affirm the existence of an eternal, Necessary Being. He then maintains that the heavenly spheres are contingent on the grounds that they are bodies; every body is composite, and whatever is composite depends upon its components, so it cannot be necessary in and of itself. The Muʿtazilites advance a similar claim: bodies are originated because they are composite, and whatever is composite requires a composer and therefore cannot be eternal. They made this principle the mainstay of their denial of God’s attributes.

These thinkers, however, use the term “composite” equivocally. If by it one means something put together by another, or whose parts were separate and later joined, or something that can be taken apart, then indeed such a thing cannot be necessary in itself or eternal. But if by “composite” one merely intends a being marked by inseparable perfections—knowledge, power, and the like—nothing in that entails that it is originated or capable of non-existence, as has been explained elsewhere.

Similarly, the words “dependence,” “part,” and “other” are all ambiguous. If “other” denotes what is wholly external and distinct, then an inseparable attribute is not said to be other than its subject. If, however, “other” simply means “not identical,” then the attribute is indeed other than the subject. A Being that is necessary through itself cannot need anything external to it, yet nothing prevents it from entailing the perfections that can never be separated from it. Calling an inseparable attribute a “part” is sophistry, and labeling the mutual entailment of subject and attribute as “dependence” is likewise deceptive, as has been detailed elsewhere.

One reason this discourse spread and led many among the people of the qiblah astray is that its proponents argue against various Muslim groups with