the entire set of factors that enter into the causation of any event is present alongside that event itself. Hence the very first event must be a condition for the second, so that after it there arises a reason by which the efficient cause is rendered operative. Yet these thinkers claim that the eternal Agent remains in one unchanging state, while at the same time asserting that the first event is a prerequisite for the second. Consequently, they do not allow that a complete, sufficient cause is present with every single occurrence, even though everything relevant to causal efficacy is part of the complete cause, and therefore the conditions of causation must accompany the act of causation. They, however, place the condition prior to the effect rather than concurrent with it—an assumption that in fact points to the very opposite of what they contend.

Furthermore, his statement, “If the coming-to-be of an event depends on a cause, an infinite regress in serial order would follow,” may be answered thus: this argument actually entails that the eternal, self-subsistent Agent is by His very essence an ever-effusive source, yet that every occurrence is preceded by another occurrence. This in turn requires that He Himself brings about the successive happenings, so that they issue from Him and the second does not occur until the first has occurred. If, then, His bringing forth of the second is contingent upon His bringing forth of the first, it is impossible for Him to be an agent by His essence, a complete cause whose effect invariably accompanies it; for what necessarily gives rise to something is not temporally separated from what it gives rise to, just as an effect is not delayed with respect to its cause. Since, therefore, He is not an agent by sheer necessity, His acts occur by His will and power, and His influence upon each individual event takes place only after He had not yet been exerting influence over it.