Al-ṢafadiyyahIbn Taimiya

is a cause of delight; in the same way, beholding something beautiful brings about delight, and knowing something congenial produces delight. Delight, however, comes about only when there is a harmony between the one who enjoys and the thing enjoyed—that harmony is love. If the knower or perceiver does not love the object that he knows or perceives, or the means by which he perceives it, then his knowledge and perception will yield no pleasure. Indeed, a person may perceive and know what harms him just as he perceives and knows what pleases him. It is therefore clear that knowledge and perception are neither identical with delight nor do they automatically entail it; they are merely a condition and a cause for it. Only when love for the object is combined with its perception and understanding does delight arise; otherwise, it does not.

Yet these people claim that delight is a particular kind of perception—namely, the perception of what is congenial. Perception, according to them, is a genus that contains two species, one of which is delight itself. If that were so, pain would have to be “the perception of what is repugnant,” so that the two species would be delight and pain. On their view, knowledge, hearing, sight, and taste would at times be pain and at other times delight—a notion whose absurdity is self-evident.

Consequently, the statement “I knew this, I saw it, I heard it,” when the thing is agreeable, would be equivalent to saying, “I luxuriated in it, rejoiced in it, was gladdened by it, exulted in it,” and likewise equivalent to saying, “I was hurt by it, I suffered from it,” and the like. The falsity of such an equivalence is obvious.

Their error stems from their denial that there are multiple attributes: they make the very essence of the rational knower identical with his intellect and his knowledge, his intellect and knowledge identical with his will, and his will identical with his power. Sound reason openly exposes the falsity of all this.

God, exalted be He, has fashioned His servants upon an innate acknowledgment of Him and a natural love for Him, and the Prophet—peace and blessings be upon him—said:

سبب للذة به وكذلك رؤية الشيء الحسن سببب للذة به والعلم بالشيء الملائم سبب للذة به فاللذة لا تحصل إن لم تكن بين الملتذ والملتذ به ملائمة وهي المحبة فإن لم يكن العالم والمدرك محبا لمعلومه ومدركه أو لما يحصل به لم يلتذ بسبب العلم والإدراك ولهذا قد يدرك الإنسان ما يؤذيه ويعلم ما يؤذيه كما يدرك ويعلم ما يلتذ به فتبين أن العلم والإدراك ليس هو اللذة ولا موجبا لها بل هو شرط فيها وسبب لها بمعنى أنه إذا حصل الحب للمعلوم والمدرك وحصل إدراكه ومعرفته حصلت اللذة به وإلا فلا. وهؤلاء يقولون: إنه إدراك مخصوص وهو إدراك الملائم فيكون الإدراك على قولهم جنسا تحته نوعان أحدهما اللذة وإذا كان أحدهما اللذة فينبغي أن يكون الألم إدراك المنافي فيكون أحد نوعيه اللذة والآخر الألم ويكون نفس العلم والسمع والبصر والذوق تارة ألما وتارة لذة وفساد هذا معلوم بالضرورة. وينبغي أن يكون قول القائل: علمت هذا ورأيته وسمعته إذا كان ملائما له بمنزلة قوله تنعمت به وفرحت به وسررت به وابتهجت به وبمنزلة قوله تأذيت به وتألمت به ونحو ذلك ومعلوم فساد هذا وهذا، وهذا ونفيهم فيه نفي الصفات المتعددة كما جعلوا نفس العاقل العالم هو نفس عقله وعلمه ونفس عقله وعلمه هو نفس إرادته ونفس إرادته هو نفس قدرته وكل هذا يعلم فساده بصريح العقل. والله تعالى فطر العباد على الإقرار به ومحبته وقد قال النبي صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ

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