eternity, nor does it prove that anything in the cosmos—whether the celestial spheres or anything else—is itself eternal. Consequently, the argument provides no support whatsoever for his desired conclusion; it merely refutes the notion that the Agent became an agent after previously not acting, and that this transition occurred without any cause at all. That view, however, is held by a faction of speculative theologians whom the early scholars and leading Imams condemned. It was unknown to the first generations of Muslims and to the eminent authorities of the faith—let alone to the Prophets and Messengers themselves. Refuting such a claim certainly does not amount to proving the world’s pre-eternity, in whole or in part; it only invalidates the doctrine advanced by the innovating scholastics, such as the Muʿtazila and those who follow their path. All this shows that sound rational proofs agree with what the Messenger—may Allah bless him and grant him peace—brought.

One way to demonstrate the unsoundness of those who posit the world’s eternity on the basis of a self-necessitating cause is as follows: either the mere essence of that cause is what necessitates the existence of the world, or its causation depends on something else. If the first alternative is chosen, then everything in the universe must be eternal and everlasting by virtue of the cause’s own eternity and perpetuity. For when nothing exists but an eternal, fully adequate cause that necessarily entails its effect, the effect must be co-eternal with it—something that flatly contradicts empirical observation. If, on the other hand, the cause’s activity is conditional upon something outside itself, that notion is, besides being unanimously invalid, fatal to their claim that the world is eternal. Further, if this “other” is itself co-eternal and necessary along with the first, so that together they constitute the complete cause, the effects must likewise be eternal by virtue of their joint eternity. Thus, whether the envisaged eternal necessitating agent is said to be one or many, once it is claimed