Furthermore, His knowledge of the order He originated is itself dependent on that order; for if we supposed that what the Originator produced were something other than this order, His knowledge would relate to that instead. Hence the cause that brings the order into being must be something other than mere knowledge.

Again, the very nature of knowledge is to conform to its object, whatever that object may be. In itself, therefore, knowledge makes no distinction between one possible order and another unless some factor exists that singles out this particular order rather than any other.

One may also ask: Is the fact that this order is the best possible order something inherent to it, or did it acquire that quality from its Maker? The first alternative is impossible, so the second must be true. If the order received its excellence from its Maker, then what bestowed it was the Maker’s Essence, not His awareness of the benefit contained in the order. For His knowing that “this is the order of good” does not even count as knowledge unless the object already is an order of good; therefore knowledge is not what made it so. In itself the order was not intrinsically an order of good—otherwise it would have to be necessary in existence. It follows that it became an order of good through its Creator, not through itself and not through knowledge alone. Consequently, if it cannot become the order of good by means of knowledge, then all the more so can it not be brought into existence by knowledge alone.

Moreover, if we suppose that the Divine Essence knows the order of good yet does not will it, producing it would be impossible. And if we suppose that It wills it but lacks the power to bring it about, producing it would likewise be impossible. Mere knowledge renders the knower neither able nor willing. Thus both power (qudrah) and will (irādah) are indispensable, and neither of them is identical with knowledge.

Further, an act’s dependence on the agent’s having power is greater than its dependence on