It is well-known that His Essence subsists in and of itself, and that positing an intellect for it is not identical with the Essence.
Again, is His Essence itself the order of goodness, or not? The first alternative is impossible, for His Essence is not the order that exists within contingent beings, and he has already distinguished between the Essence and that order—this is clear. Since His Essence is a Knower, it follows that the knower is neither the knowledge nor the thing known, and this invalidates their contention.
Furthermore, is the order that permeates the whole universe necessary in itself, or contingent? If it is necessary, the contingent would become necessary and the originated would become the originator—an absurdity. If it is contingent, what brings it about: His Essence, His knowledge of it, or both together? If His Essence alone is the cause, His knowledge of the order is superfluous and the Essence would be stripped of knowledge. If His knowledge alone is the cause, then the Essence produces the knowledge and the knowledge produces the order; thus Essence and knowledge are two distinct things, which contradicts his own statement—and the contradiction remains if one claims that both together are the cause.
Moreover, how could mere knowledge of the order, by itself, necessitate that order? Bare knowledge never brings the object known into existence—neither in theoretical cognition nor in practical endeavor. With respect to theoretical knowledge this is obvious, and with respect to practical knowledge, knowledge is only a prerequisite for action; it does not by itself produce the action, otherwise anyone who conceived of a desired thing would bring it into being simply by conceiving it.
And if it be said that knowledge is divided into an active and a passive mode, the most that active knowledge can do is serve as a condition for action; it is not the efficient cause of the action itself. Hence the claim that knowledge alone brings about the cosmic order is an allegation offered without proof—sheer assertion—and once one grasps it, one sees that it is necessarily false.