Without the effect, the cause has no existence; it can exist only alongside it. Since the movements of the celestial sphere are originated events, they require originated causes that arise with them. The sphere and everything within it are contingent effects produced by something else, so whatever occurs inside it must have an efficient cause external to it. What we say about that cause is what we say about every other: one must affirm an Agent whose existence is necessary in itself. It is impossible that His action should depend on anything else, for this would entail a vicious circle or an infinite regress. He, therefore, must be the One who brings all of this into being.
It is likewise impossible that He has been bringing about the daily rotation from pre-eternity, because such a motion itself cannot exist from pre-eternity. Every daily rotation comes into being only when accompanied by its complete cause, and so in pre-eternity no complete cause for any motion exists at all. The presence of such a cause in pre-eternity, whether with those motions or apart from them, is therefore impossible, and under either assumption the cause could not be eternal.
If one were to claim that He is eternal together with the motions, He would not be eternal with their totality, nor with any specific daily rotation—for the eternity of any of these is impossible—nor with a succession of motions.
First of all, an effect cannot be simultaneous with its agent in time; this is inconceivable both in what we observe and in what lies beyond observation, whether the agent acts by will or without will—still more so if He acts by will.
Thus the assertion, “If the agent acts by the necessity of His own essence, it is permissible for the effect to be concomitant with Him,” is erroneous and contradicts the conviction of the vast majority of rational human beings, early and late, among the adherents of revealed religions and most philosophers alike. Only a small fringe of philosophers have said this. What can be conceived is a necessary concomitant that is not an act, such as a self that necessarily entails its attributes. An effect, however, can never—under any circumstances—be contemporaneous with its agent, as has been explained elsewhere in detail.