We reply:
This answer is flawed in two respects.

First, the problem of accounting for the coming-to-be of this particular motion is exactly the same as the problem of accounting for the coming-to-be of any other motion—whether natural, forced, or voluntary—especially since they themselves classify it as voluntary.

He then goes on to say:

“As for voluntary motion, its causes are a single, abiding volitional factor, something like a universal that inclines toward the goal first apprehended in conception; that goal is preserved in its very identity and remains fixed. Then will succeeds will, so that one envisions distance after distance and a determinate place after place, just as motion follows upon motion. All of this occurs by way of perpetual renewal, not through enduring permanence. One thing alone remains constant at all times—the abiding universal will, which here plays the role that nature plays in natural motion—while other factors are continually generated, namely particular conceptions and diverse volitions, just as in natural motion the degrees of nearness and farness vary. All of them, therefore, exist only in the mode of origination.”