of something outside itself and of a particular condition is, by that very fact, dependent upon a cause. Thus it is clear that the continuance of an originated entity—its remaining in being after it has come to be—owes itself to a cause that sustains its existence, for that existence is not necessary in and of itself. Accordingly, no logician has the right to object and say, “Real possibility belongs only to the state in which the thing is nonexistent; once it comes to be, its existence is necessary.” If such a person still calls the thing “possible,” the designation is no more than a homonymous usage. Our answer to him is this: if actual existence renders the thing necessarily existent, then nonexistence must likewise render it necessarily nonexistent, and possibility would have no place at all. For just as, whenever the thing exists, it is necessary—that is, it must remain in being for as long as it exists—so too, whenever it is nonexistent, it would be necessary—that is, it would remain nonexistent for as long as