To summarize: an originated entity can in fact remain; therefore it is impossible to say that at the very instant of its coming-to-be it has already ceased to exist, for that would be to unite two contraries. Nor may one contend that its non-existence must necessarily follow immediately upon its origination—except in cases such as motion. In other kinds of phenomena we know that some elements do in fact endure. Besides, the opposing claim would entail a succession of discrete instants, a view that depends on positing an indivisible atomic substance, so that each “now” would be an indivisible part following upon another “now,” an assumption that invalidates the argument itself.

In short, the premise here is that among originated things there are entities that persist; this is a truth no one seriously contests. As for the statement attributed to al-Nazzām that bodies do not persist, one might say that it clashes with self-evident knowledge; or that the disagreement is merely verbal; or that it pertains to a different issue—namely, whether an originated being, while it lasts, is in need of something to preserve it. It has been suggested that al-Nazzām advanced this claim only to oppose his fellow Muʿtazilites, who held that an originated thing requires a cause only at the moment of its generation, not while it endures. He therefore asserted that a thing that continues to exist remains in need of a cause during its persistence. This same point is precisely what Ibn Sīnā intended, and it is the correct view upheld by Ahl al-Sunnah wa’l-Jamāʿah and by the great majority of rational thinkers.

For this reason Ibn Sīnā subsequently stated, in words that are wholly sound:

“It is inconceivable that an originated thing should possess enduring existence by its very essence, such that once it comes into being its existence and persistence would be necessary without any cause for that existence or for that persistence.

Indeed, you know that every originated entity—even every effect—is …”