—for example—one of them might will to give life to a body while the other wills to bring about its death, or one might will to set it in motion while the other wills to keep it at rest, and the like.

If it is said that the two must be in agreement with respect to the act, meaning that whenever one of them does something the other offers no opposition, then neither of them would be capable except on the condition that the other grant him leave and refrain from counteracting him. This would mean that neither possesses power in and of himself—an impossibility, as has already been shown.

If, however, their “agreement in action” is taken to mean joint participation in producing the very same effect, then two independent agents sharing one and the same effect is impossible, as previously demonstrated.

And if “sharing” is understood to mean that this one has an act and an effected object distinct from the act and object of the other, that would necessitate that each god take away what he created, whereas the world is intricately interconnected and each part depends upon the other in a manner that precludes some of it being the work of one and some the work of another.

Thus, should two agents be posited, it would follow that each god would take away what he created and that some of them would gain ascendancy over others: each would take away what he created because the product of one differs from the product of the other; and their mutual ascendancy would arise because, being capable, each is self-sufficient in his power and can act without the other.

Consequently, it is impossible for them to act upon anything at all—whether they are in agreement, for a single act cannot proceed from two doers, or whether they are at odds, for that would entail mutual obstruction, each thwarting the other. Inevitably, then, one of them would be the capable one while the other would not, so that