Al-Ṣafadiyyah - Ibn Taimiya - (2/168)

If one says, “The Lord has never ceased to be powerful,” yet also claims that the act was not possible, then later became possible, and that it is impossible for the act to have been forever within the scope of His power, the real meaning of such speech is, “He has never ceased to be able, even though He was not able, then became able.” To affirm power while the object of that power is held to be impossible is to unite two contraries, and the present argument does exactly that.

The reason is clear: an act that is, by definition, preceded by non-existence must have a first beginning. Everything preceded by non-existence has a first moment, for non-existence comes before it; whereas that which has no first moment is not preceded by anything at all and is everlasting without beginning.

Thus, when it is said, “The act, on the condition that it is preceded by non-existence, has no first instant for its possibility,” the statement really means, “An act that, by definition, has a first moment has no first moment.”

A comparable contradiction appears in their attempt to distinguish between “the eternality of soundness” and “the soundness of eternality,” or, as they sometimes state it, between “the possibility of eternality” and “the eternality of possibility.” This is a distinction without a difference. If possibility (which they call soundness) is eternal, that can only mean that the act has never ceased to be both possible and sound.

This, then, is what they intend by the phrase “the eternality of possibility and soundness.” Yet it plainly entails conceding the possibility—and the soundness—of the act’s being eternal. In fact, either the act’s eternality is established in reality, or its eternality is impossible. If what is established is impossibility, then the act was impossible from all eternity and therefore never possible. In that case, possibility would not be eternal but would arise after non-existence—a claim that the possibility of the act is not eternal but originated without any cause compelling that origination, directly contradicting their assertion of the eternality of possibility.

فإذا قيل لم يزل الرب قادرا وقيل مع ذلك لم يكن الفعل ممكنا ثم صار ممكنا وأنه يمتنع أن يكون الفعل لم يزل مقدورا كان حقيقة الكلام لم يزل قادرا مع كونه كان غير قادر ثم صار قادرا فإن إثبات القادرية مع امتناع المقدور جمع بين المتناقضين وكذلك هذا وذلك أن الفعل بشرط كونه مسبوقا بالعدم يجب أن يكون له أول فكل ما سبق بالعدم فله أول إذ العدم قبله وما لا أول له ليس قبله شيء بل هو دائم لم يزل. فإذا قيل: الفعل بشرط كونه مسبوقا بالعدم لا أول لإمكانه كان المعنى أن الفعل بشرط كونه له أول لا أول له ونظير هذا التناقض فرقهم بين أزلية الصحة وصحة الأزلية وربما قالوا بين إمكان الأزلية وأزلية الإمكان وهو فرق لا حقيقة له فإنه إذا كان الإمكان الذي هو الصحة أزليا فمعنى ذلك أنه لم يزل الفعل ممكنا صحيحا. هذا هو المراد بأزلية الإمكان والصحة ومعلوم أن هذا يتضمن إمكان أزلية الفعل وصحة ذلك فإنه إما أن يكون الثابت في نفس الأمر أزلية الفعل أو امتناعها فإن كان الثابت هو الامتناع كان الفعل ممتنعا في الأزل فلم يكن ممكنا وحينئذ فلا يكون الإمكان أزليا بل حادثا بعد أن لم يكن وهذا قول بأن إمكان الفعل ليس بأزلي بل حادث بعد أن لم يكن من غير مسبب يوجب حدوثه وهو خلاف قولهم بأزلية الإمكان.