is rejected by the overwhelming majority of Muslim dialecticians and even of the philosophers, just as it is rejected by the instinctive judgment of sound minds; for to claim that the essence of a contingent being subsists outside the mind while that being itself does not exist externally is untenable. Their stock example—that a person can picture a triangle while doubting whether it exists—proves nothing, for he is conceiving it only in his mind. All rational people agree that what the intellect imagines is different from what exists outside it. Thus, if by “essence” one means the mental concept and by “existence” what is outside the mind, then saying, “The essence of a thing is other than its existence,” is correct. What is objectionable is to take “essence” to be something established in external reality yet distinct from the actuality that is outside the mind, and then to say that this essence is the true reality of the existent. A fuller discussion of this lies elsewhere.
Second consideration: Even granting the point for the sake of argument, the eternal being whose existence is necessary through another has always had its essence present, and existence is inseparable from it; conceiving its absence is impossible. Therefore, to say that it “may exist and may not exist” is false, for its non-existence is impossible in every respect. At most, the existence that necessarily accompanies it comes to it from something other than itself, not from itself—yet it remains an existence that is necessary through another. This, however, presupposes that an eternal, pre-existent entity could be an effect, and that is instinctively ruled out by all rational minds.
For that very reason the divine Scriptures address people with sound, innate rational truths: the Messengers were sent to affirm and perfect the primordial disposition (fiṭrah), not to alter or overturn it. The soul attains its perfection—its happiness and salvation—through a fiṭrah brought to completion by the revealed law. Hence, whenever God mentions in His Book any of the names that denote action, sensible minds understand from it only that the act is newly originated, as in His saying:
“Read in the name of …”